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Résumé / Abstract
La confiance a régulièrement été considérée comme un facteur clef lié au
bon fonctionnement des équipes ou des organisations virtuelles. Cette étude
démontre que le niveau de compétence et l’intégrité sont des pré-requis à la
confiance. Elle démontre toutefois que la performance des groupes de travail n’est
pas reliée directement à l’établissement de la confiance.
Trust has been deemed to be critical in ensuring the efficient operation of
virtual teams and organizations. This study empirically verified ability and
integrity as being antecedents of trust formation in virtual teams. However,
effective team performance was found to be independent of the formation of trust.
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1Introduction
Organizations today are being transformed. Recent advances in information systems technology,
combined with a more flexible approach to organization design, have led to an increased number
of people working away from their colleagues. Information technologies are making possible new
organizational forms, while at the same time eradicating the notion of distance, and compressing
the time required to circulate information among teams and departments. The Internet allows
people from around the world to work together on a common project for very little cost. More
and more, enterprises have employees who are not physically present at the traditional premises
of the organization. They work at their clients’ location, in satellite offices (where the costs are
lower), or simply at their homes. Hence, many employees now work on teams that seldom, if
ever, meet face-to-face. These teams have the same responsibilities and challenges that regular
ones do, plus they have the added challenge of managing the efforts, dynamics and processes of a
team that may only meet in cyberspace.
These dispersed arrangements are affecting more and more large organizations. For example,
airline companies are profiting from the comparative advantages of several countries. Thus,
Swissair manages their point system for “frequent flyers” from Bombay. American Airlines runs
their accounting operations in Barbados. More than 1,000 employees work there and they are
linked, via satellite, with the rest of the company’s offices. Likewise, Anderson offers
information services to Continental, Delta and Air Canada. The computers on which these
operations are executed are in Minneapolis while the employees who perform all the tasks
required to perform these operations are in Mexico (Donoghue, 1993).
Theoretical Framework
While virtual organizations have taken on more importance in recent years, dispersed
collaboration has existed in most periods. As early as the Middle Ages, trade relied on coalitions
of dispersed collaborators (Greif, 1989). Trust in these commercial partners and their fulfillment
of promises, at a time when information could take months to travel from one partner to another,
relied on the reputation of the partner and promises of future trading.
Similarly, for more modern collaborators, most writers contend that trust is a determining factor
in the effectiveness in any complex system requiring coordinated action (Fukuyama, 1995;
Seabright, Levinthal & Fishman, 1992). For example, trust in a contractual relationship can
facilitate the exchange of information and bring about a reduction in control and its associated
costs (Zand, 1972) since the parties do not have to fear any manifestations of opportunism
(Granovetter, 1985; Hill, 1990; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 1997). Yet, Simon (1991)
has indicated that the notions of trust and loyalty have not been sufficiently considered in
economic approaches, while only recently have management and organizational behaviour
researchers begun any indepth investigations of trust (e.g. Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995;
McAllister, 1995). Our research is designed to increase our understanding of the role of trust in
virtual teams from both an economic perspective and an organizational behavioural one.
2One key component in a successful virtual team is the ability of the team members to deliver the
promised work. It is generally assumed that a critical factor in the successful completion of a
project is trust in fellow team members to deliver their share of the work on time and with
sufficient quality (e.g. Jarvenpaa, Knoll & Leidner, 1998). Agency theory provides some insight
into the dynamics that could be involved in the formation of this type of trust.
Two main thrusts of agency theory are the ability to trust and the contract conditions most
conducive to motivating the agent to perform the agreed-upon work to the principal’s
satisfaction.  In all transactions between two parties, the economic partners act in their own best
interests. This opportunism signifies that control mechanisms and incentives must be in place to
ensure that they respect the terms of the agreement. The parties are limited by bounded rationality
and they cannot foresee all the contingencies bound to a contract (Williamson, 1985). In every
contract, it is possible that the agent will not exert maximum effort, or that he will cheat on the
value of the services rendered. Each party may not have any other choice but to monitor the other
parties or to establish incentive mechanisms to motivate the collaborators. All these mechanisms
are expensive. The agency costs represent the costs of writing contracts, costs of applying
contractual clauses (e.g. surveillance, incentives, etc.), and the lost residuals resulting from
imperfectly coordinating and motivating the contracting parties (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Sappington, 1991). The formation of trust is
desirable since it reduces the costs of monitoring and controlling, hence making the transaction
more efficient.
Many of these elements, notably all the aspects of control, assume that observation is feasible. In
a virtual team context, observing other team members’ efforts is impossible. The Mayer, Davis
and Schoorman (1995, p. 712) definition of trust encapsulates the dilemma faced by virtual
teams. They define trust as: “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (italics added). High
trust, if justified, would enable virtual teams to work efficiently, without incurring high agency
costs.
McAllister (1995) developed a theoretical framework which incorporated the impact of  trust
formation and monitoring on performance. He viewed trust having both cognitive and affective
foundations. Cognition-based trust is based on the factual knowledge the trustor has of the trustee
(which closely parallels agency theory’s conceptualization of trust), while affect-based trust
consists of the emotional bonds between people. He found that the formation of cognition-based
trust was positively correlated with the formation of affect-based trust and preceded its
development. Affect-based trust in turn had a significant impact on need-based monitoring and
citizenship behaviour, both of which were significantly related to the performance levels of the
managers in his study.
Mayer et al (1995) viewed three different antecedents as being critical to trust formation: the
trustee’s perceived ability, benevolence and integrity. They postulated that integrity would have
the most impact in the early stages of relationship, while the impact of benevolence on trust
formation would increase over time. While not explicitly stated, Mayer et al seem to view the
3impact of ability on trust formation as remaining constant over the course of the relationship
(Kelsey, 1999). A personality characteristic of the trustor, propensity to trust, was thought to
moderate the impact of these three antecedent on trust formation, as well as being an antecedent
itself. Propensity to trust was thought to remain stable throughout a relationship. Jarvenpaa et al
(1998) tested the Mayer et al model in their research study on trust formation in global virtual
teams and found support for this model. They did not test any links with performance.
This current research tested the relationships among the antecedents of trust, trust formation and
performance outcomes. First, the antecedents of trust, as presented in Mayer et al (1995) and in
Jarvenpaa et al. (1998) were formally tested in a longitudinal manner, evaluating their
relationships with trust at the beginning of a project in a virtual environment and assessing again
the same relationships at the end of the project.  Hence the first three hypotheses were designed
to test Propositions 2, 3 and 4 from Mayer et al (1995, p. 720 & 722), while the fourth hypothesis
was designed to test the proposition that as virtual teammates worked together and acquired more
knowledge about each other, trust would grow.
Hypothesis 1: Trust for a trustee will be a function of the trustee’s perceived
ability, benevolence and integrity, and of the trustor’s propensity to trust.
Hypothesis 2: The effect of integrity on trust will be most salient early in the
relationship prior to the development of meaningful benevolence data.
Hypothesis 3: The effect of perceived benevolence on trust will increase over time
as the relationship between the parties develops.
Hypothesis 4: The level of trust among local and remote teammates would
increase as the project progressed.
Second, the link between trust and performance was also assessed.  Building on McAllister’s
(1995) work, it was hypothesized:
Hypothesis 5: The level of trust among teammates will be positively associated
with effective performance.
Methodology
Sample
Business students from two universities took part in this study. One of the universities is located
in Toronto, Ontario, and the other in Montreal, Quebec. In total, 71 students participated in the
study, which resulted in 68 sets of usable questionnaires being completed. All these students were
in either the third or fourth year of their bachelor degree. The students self-selected their local
teammates, but were randomly grouped into eleven virtual teams composed of students from both
Montreal and Toronto. They were asked to conduct a research project and submit a formal report
at the end of the semester. The typical team was consisted of three students from each university.
4Since there were more Montreal students than Toronto students, some teams had four students
from Montreal and others had only two students from Toronto.
The students had three months to produce a research paper on a topic of their choice. A list of
potential topics was provided. Deadlines were also given. Teams had to write an abstract of their
paper early in the process in order to verify that they were on a promising track. To communicate,
they had access to a web site with several chat rooms and to email. The papers were graded, and
the results accounted for a significant part of their final evaluation for their course. All students in
a team received the same grade (in Montreal and in Toronto). It was clearly presented and
implemented as a joint project.
In order to assess the variables, the measures used were those of Jarvenpaa et al. (1998).
Questionnaires were completed at the beginning of the project, to assess the initial trust
participants had in their colleagues, and  at the end of the project, to assess the trust they had after
completing their task. Measures were taken for two groups. First, respondents were asked to
answer the questionnaire for their local partners. Then, they answered the same questionnaire
with respect to the members of their team in the other university (the remote group). Therefore,
four sets of data were collected:
1. Initial measure—local members
2. Initial measure—remote members
3. Final measure—local members
4. Final measure—remote members
The measures, as shown in Table 1, presented great level of reliability. Only one item,
from the propensity to trust measure, was dropped after the reliability analysis. The measures are
provided in Appendix (all items were answered on a 1-7 scale).
Table 1: Reliability (Cronbach Alpha)
Initial Final
Local Remote Local Remote
Ability 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.92
Benevolence 0.72 0.91 0.87 0.94
Integrity 0.86 0.90 0.79 0.90
Propensity to trust 0.69 0.82 0.82 0.74
Trust 0.81 0.68 0.80 0.79
5Analysis
In order to compare the levels of trust among the different sub-groups (local members and remote
members), T-tests were performed. To validate the antecedents of trust, Partial Least Squares
(PLS), a second generation multivariate method, was used. First generation multivariate methods,
like multiple regression, factor analysis, analysis of variance and others help evaluate constructs
and relationships between constructs.  However, such an evaluation has to be performed in
subsequent steps.  Other methods, called second generation methods (Fornell 1984) perform
analysis of a model as a whole instead of simply evaluating each relationship separately.  Instead
of simply aggregating measurement error in a residual error term, these methods simultaneously
evaluate both the measurement model and the theoretical model.  They adjust the relationships
among the variables accordingly (Aubert, Rivard, and Patry, 1996). Two of these newer methods,
and probably the most popular ones, are covariance structure analysis (most often referred to as
LISREL) and partial least squares (PLS). PLS presupposes no distributional form of the data.
The required sample size for analysis is 10 times the number of items in the largest construct.
Five times the largest construct is considered adequate but less stringent (Gopal, Bosrom and
Chin, 1992). In this research, the largest construct is Ability, with six items. The sample (68
respondents) was deemed adequate. It exceeds the 10 to 1 ratio for all the constructs.
Results
Trust
A first examination of the results shows an interesting fact. Initially, the students tended to put
more trust in their team members from their own university, as shown in Table 2. The difference
between the level of trust in the local members of the team and the level of trust in the remote
members of the team is significant. The initial difference could be attributed to the lack of
knowledge the students had of their remote partners. It is safe to assume that they knew most of
their local partners from previous courses taken in the same program.
Table 2: Trust Levels
Level of Trust Initial Final
Local team members 4.81 4.99
Remote team members 3.52 3.23
Level of sig. (local – remote) .000 .000
If this hypothesis were true (the lower level of trust was attributable to the lack of
knowledge), the level of trust in the remote teammates should increase with time, after several
interactions with the team members. Looking at the results, it is clear that the frequent
interactions (over more than three months) were not sufficient to increase trust. The results
6indicate that the difference between trust put in local members versus remote members did not
decrease. In fact, the opposite occurred, the difference went from 1.26 to 1.83 (on a 1-7 scale).
Interestingly, this increased difference is due to two combined effects. First, the trust in the local
team increased significantly (p<.05) while the trust in the remote team decreased slightly (but the
difference was not significant at the .05 level). Thus, hypothesis 4 was disproved.
Antecedents of Trust
When observing the antecedents of trust, a very similar pattern is observable (Table 3). All
independent variables show stronger numbers for the local team members than for the remote
partners. In all cases, the difference between the two sub-groups is significant. This is observable
for both the initial and the final evaluations. This trend, observable for the trust level and its
antecedents, indicates that virtual teams failed to establish the necessary conditions for trust to
develop effectively during the process.
Table 3 : Means and Significance of Difference – Independent Variables (Initial – Remote)
Initial Final
Local Remote Sig. Local Remote Sig.
Ability 5.59 4.49 .000 5.81 4.07 .000
Benevolence 5.81 4.83 .000 5.89 4.54 .000
Integrity 5.63 4.50 .000 5.67 4.04 .000
Propensity to trust 5.05 4.73 .029 5.23 4.41 .000
Relationships Between Trust and Antecedents of Trust
When observing the relationships between the antecedents of trust and trust, several elements can
be noted. First, the elements pertaining to the initial evaluation will be mentioned, followed by
the analysis of the final evaluation. It is interesting to note that, in all cases, the percentage of
variance explained in the PLS models is very good, ranging from 46% to 64%.
Figure 1 reveals the similarity between the patterns (PLS) observed for local and remote
members of the teams in the initial evaluation. In both the local and the remote evaluations,
integrity shows the strongest link with trust. The second significant link is the one between ability
and trust. It was hypothesized that integrity would have the strongest link at the beginning of the
team life and that the influence of ability would be constant. The propensity to trust does not
appear to influence trust, nor does the benevolence (the link is negative, but not significant).
7Figure 1: Initial Evaluation
When observing the final evaluations, the pattern is very stable for the local team members.
Integrity still plays the strongest role, and ability comes in second. For the remote team, integrity
remains the strongest driver, followed by ability. The main difference is in the role of the
propensity to trust. For the first time, this variable presents a significant link, in the direction
expected, with trust. Thus, Hypothesis 1 received only partial support; perceived ability and
perceived integrity were positively linked to the formation of trust, but perceived benevolence
was not. Propensity to trust  was only significant in one of the four evaluations. Hypotheses 2 and
3 were not supported, as integrity remained the strongest driver to explain trust and benevolence
never had a significant effect on the level of trust, not even at the end of the project.
Figure 2:  Final Evaluation
8Performance
In order to evaluate performance, the links of the two measures of trust (initial and final) with the
success (the final score obtained for the project) were measured. Since trust was believed to have
a positive effect for the whole duration of the project, it was relevant to try to assess the overall
effect of trust. High trust at the beginning of the project should enable teams to start their work
on better terms. Similarly, high trust at the end of the project would mean that trust was probably
high during the last miles of the project, when critical decisions and work are made. Since we
have these two measures (for both local and remote team members), each one was linked to
performance in a causal model. The results are presented in Figure 3. Only one of the four links is
significant (between final/remote trust and performance) and the variance explained is very
limited (21.4%). Thus Hypothesis 5 was not supported; for three of the four evaluations of trust,
there was no significant relationship between the trust levels among teammates and the
effectiveness of their performance.
Figure 3: Trust and Performance
Discussion
Many interesting elements can be extracted from the results. First, it appears that trust among the
members of a team having the opportunity to meet face to face is consistently higher than trust
with the members with whom the interactions are strictly virtual. This result was obtained even if
teams had access to a rich environment (mail, chat, forums, web site, exchange of photos on the
web site, etc.) to increase the quality of their interactions. The results also indicate that, contrary
to what was anticipated, trust among interacting parties does not increase with time and number
of interactions. In fact, results showed that trust increased among sub-groups interacting face to
face but decreased among members meeting only in cyberspace. This suggests a major lesson for
organizations establishing virtual teams. It means that face to face interactions should be
organized for team members once in a while, to ensure that trust can be maintained or increased
within the teams. Intensive IT usage, avatars or pictures are not sufficient to foster trust. These
9differences were observed for teams composed of members with similar backgrounds, having
mostly the same citizenship and the same culture. The gap would probably be even larger for
teams comprised of team members from very disparate cultures, countries, languages, etc.
The second main element emerging from the results pertains to the antecedents of trust. These
variables had systematically higher values for local team members than for remote team members
and the differences increased with the passage of time. Rather than increasing the perceived
ability, benevolence and integrity of remote team members, interaction (or lack thereof) with
remote teammates actually decreased the perceived levels. Perhaps the inability of the local
partners to monitor what the remote partners were actually doing contributed to fundamental
attribution errors (Miller & Lawson, 1989) being made. Fundamental attribution error casts the
actions of others in a less positive light that actual facts would indicate. Additional effort is
required to avoid making this type of error—effort which may not have been expended by the
remote teammates. This indicates that members of virtual teams need to concentrate on exerting
extra effort to overcome the limitations on building relationships inherent in virtual interaction,
an observation that reinforces the findings of Jarvenpaa et al (1998).
When observing the links between the antecedents of trust and the trust level, we observed that
integrity was the key driver for trust. In all cases (local, distant, ex ante and ex post) integrity had
the strongest significant link with the trust level. The fact that integrity remained the key driver
over time contradicts the expectations. It was anticipated that, with time, the role of integrity
would decrease while the role of benevolence would increase. The results showed that while
integrity remained the strongest link, the impact of benevolence over time failed to materialize.
One possible explanation would be that the project was not long enough (3 months).  However,
the interactions among team members were intense and a change in patterns among antecedents,
if anticipations were true, should have been observed.
These observations are consistent with the cognitive trust usually associated with economic
behavior (and agency theory). Integrity means that the partners are perceived as not being
“cheaters,” while ability corresponds to the competence of agents. The common goal, established
in the design of the experiment itself, provided the appropriate incentive structure. Thus, trust
formation appears to be a very rational conclusion.
Finally, the last interesting element is the lack of influence of trust on the team performance.
High performance teams could have a very low trust level, and low performance teams could
maintain a high trust level. Only one of the four measures of trust reached significance, and that
was the final rating of trust among remote team members. When observing the results presented
in Figure 3, the first element that emerges is the very low percentage of the variance explained
(21%). Trust is, therefore, a very poor predictor of performance and definitely not an antecedent
of success.
Thus, it appears that while trust is valued and reduces the effort required from the team members,
it does not ensure the attainment of the results when the stakes are high. Put another way, lack of
trust (or distrust) does not prevent a team from delivering quality results. The teams managed to
hand over a deliverable corresponding to their capabilities, with or without trust. To verify if this
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hypothesis is true, the effort required to produce the final report should have been measured. This
measurement would have helped to determine if it was additional effort that was the key driver in
delivering a quality result by compensating for the lack of trust. This provides an interesting path
for future research and a potential refinement the understanding of the trust-performance
relationship.
Conclusion
This paper assessed the relationship among the antecedents of trust and the level of trust
formation in virtual teams, as well as the relationship between trust and performance. The
empirical findings revealed that the perceived ability, integrity and benevolence of remote
teammates were significantly lower that the ratings of local teammates, and that this gap
increased as the projects proceeded. Trust was also higher among local teammates than among
the remote partners. Finally, the results indicate that the formation of trust is not necessary for a
virtual team to deliver a quality result. The results of this research have revised our understanding
of the role of trust in facilitating effective performance and point to the importance of improving
our understanding of the complex relationship that exists between effort exerted, ability, trust and
final performance levels.
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Appendix A
Trust Survey Measures (Adapted from Jarvenpaa et al, 1998)
Trust
If I had my way, I wouldn’t let the other team members have any influence over issues that are
important to the project. (reversed)
I would be comfortable giving the other team members complete responsibility for the
completion of this project.
I really wish I had a good way to oversee the work of the other team members on the project.
(reversed)
I would be comfortable giving the other team members a task or problem that was critical to
the project, even if I could not monitor them.
Ability
I feel very confident about the other team members’ skills.
The other team members have much knowledge about the work that needs to be done.
The other team members have specialized capabilities that can increase our performance.
The other team members are well qualified.
The other team members are very capable of performing their tasks.
The other team members seem to be successful in the activities they undertake.
Benevolence
The other team members are very concerned about the ability of the team to get along.
The outcomes of this project are very important to the other team members.
The other team members would not knowingly do anything to disrupt or slow down the
project.
The other team members are concerned about what is important to the team.
The other team members will do everything in their capacity to help the team perform.
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Integrity
The other team members try hard to be fair in dealing with one another.
The other team members have a strong sense of commitment.
I never am doubtful about whether the other team members will do what they promised.
I like the work values of the members on this team.
The other team members do not behave in a consistent manner – I  am never sure if they are
going to do what they promise or not. (reversed)
The other team members display a solid work ethic.
Propensity to Trust
One should be very cautious when working with students. (reversed) - dropped
Most students tell the truth about the limits of their knowledge.
Most students can be counted on to do what they say they will do.
Most students are honest in describing their experiences and abilities.
Scale for all questions:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
Disagree I neither agree Agree
nor disagree
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